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DERIDASC Scientific Background Report
1 Introduction
Deconstructive Evaluation of Risk In Dependability Arguments and Safety Cases
(DERIDASC) is a study focussed on the language used by safety engineers in their
intellectual discourse. The DERIDASC project is inter-disciplinary in the sense that it
uses techniques from philosophy, literary theory (Eagleton 1996, Culler 1997) and
semiotics (Barthes 1994, Cobley 2001, Culler 1981) to diagnose problems of
language, definition, and interpretation in safety engineering. The project aims to
make safety engineers re-think and perhaps improve some of their habitual
definitions. The project adopts methods of textual analysis usually found only in
studies of the arts and literature, although the kinds of textual studies we propose have
also been influential in the discipline of law (Ward 1998, Chapter 7).
In particular, the project will apply the ideas of “deconstruction” to safety texts.
Deconstruction is a term coined by philosopher Jacques Derrida (Abrams 1999), and
describes the analysis of a text to reveal hidden meanings, especially those which
contradict the surface message of a text; the critical reader reads a text “against the
grain”, concentrating less on what the author is trying to say than on issues such as
what the text tries to avoid saying (e.g. the playing down of facts that might
undermine what is argued) and on what is asserted rhetorically. The idea of
deconstruction is appropriate to the aims of the DERIDASC project because it
challenges the unconscious presuppositions inherited from conceptual frameworks for
thinking. Deconstruction, it can be argued, facilitates the evaluation of language as a
‘technology’ for thinking (Clark 2000). On DERIDASC we examine the natural
language used in safety engineering.
Safety engineering needs a critical understanding of its underlying conceptual
frameworks because safety judgement is an irreducibly subjective process. It involves
technical and scientific questions, as the natural world does not to tell us the objective
value of human life and health. Safety judgement is deeply dependent on the kind of
future we envisage, because the appeal of that future will determine the risks we are
willing to accept. It is also philosophically problematic: it requires a mode of
reasoning known as “inductive logic”, that is, an assumption that data about the past
are indicative of future trends, and thus are a reliable guide for future action (Paulos
2000, p. 64 mentions that Bertrand Russell dubbed inductive reasoning “the scandal
of philosophy”). If we suppose that safety engineering has ethical foundations and
involves subjective judgement, problems of language become as relevant to safety
engineering as they are in disciplines such as ethics, philosophy, and politics.
In this initial report, we review the background influences on the DERIDASC project.
In Section 2, we explain our interest in postmodern approaches to philosophy and
language, and how the centrality of subjective interpretation in postmodernism is
relevant to safety engineering. In Section 3 we give an informal deconstructive
analysis of a safety text, using the example to explain the generic concerns of
deconstructive analyses. In Section 4, we offer a brief summary of relevant Literary
Theory, covering hermeneutics, structuralism, semiotics, poststructuralism, and
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speech-act theory. Section 4 ends with a discussion of the relationship of
deconstruction to speech-act theory. In Section 5, we deal briefly with various
critiques of postmodernism and deconstruction.
2 Why Postmodernism?
Classical philosophy has traditionally focussed on problems of logic and knowledge
(epistemology), and has already been very influential in safety engineering,
particularly in the design of languages for system specification, such as fault trees,
and the development of formal methods. For example, the ‘truth tables’ of
propositional logic derive from the early philosophy of Wittgenstein, who introduced
them in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Grayling 2001, p. 32).
What is less widely-known is that the later Wittgenstein rejected his own early
philosophy. Specifically, he rejected the idea of ‘logical atomism’, which presupposes
that language is hierarchical, and at its lowest level connects to reality in a simple an
unproblematic way. The rejection of his earlier classically-influenced views could be
said to have triggered the modern trend in philosophy to debate how language and
reality are connected, and even to propose that language creates different perceptions.
Indeed, it was Wittgenstein who coined the proverbial term “language games”
(Grayling 2001, p. 83).
What is misleadingly termed ‘continental’ philosophy (many proponents of
continental philosophy are non-European) has traditionally focused on the problems
of knowledge and subjective being (ontology) rather than epistemology. The
postmodern tradition picked up by DERIDASC extends the continental tradition by a
close focus on ‘the problem of language’ (Critchley 2001). The relative novelty of the
possibility that postmodernism might have something to teach safety engineers
explains our focus more than a polemical attempt to reject classical influences;
however, our project was inspired by the intuition that logical and mathematical
modelling in safety engineering is often more subjective, and less founded upon
indisputable evidence, than might be thought. DERIDASC will employ not only
postmodern ideas about language but, where appropriate, any classical approaches
that will aid in the analysis of safety engineering language. Magpie-like borrowing is
not inconsistent with deconstructive thinking, although deconstruction is deeply
concerned with the possibility that since ‘borrowing’ involves interpretation, it also
involves necessary alteration.
2.1  Subjectivity and Freedom in Risk Acceptance
Safety engineering involves, and indeed fuels, ongoing ethical debates about the
perceived value of human life and health and the perceived benefits of putting lives at
risk. Although scientific methods can be useful, the criteria for success or failure in
safety engineering are matters of social construction not of discovery: the definition of
an “acceptable risk” can only be socially agreed. Terms like “value” or “benefit” are
not natural forces like gravity and electromagnetism, but are ascribed by humans to
their own activities.
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However, the subjectivity implied in safety thinking does not leave safety engineers
free to invent “acceptable risks” without external constraint. For example, the idea
that the level of risk reduction commercially and technically feasible at the present
time is by definition “acceptable” leads immediately to problems. It inhibits the drive
for risk reduction and could be seen as unethical; if it later becomes feasible to
eliminate a risk at a reasonable cost (e.g. because of a technology improvement), why
bother if the risk is “acceptable”? Following such lines, safety thinking would
degenerate into the circular re-interpretation of goals to mask insufficient achievement
and disappointment; but humans construct ideologies to endow their enterprises with
worth and value: and because they are tool builders and manipulators of the natural
world, what is ‘commercially and technically feasible’ is to some extent a matter for
their decision. The redefinition of partial success as “all that is reasonable” is vaguely
unsatisfying and this spurs us on to an ethic of continuous improvement.
Ideological goals drive safety engineering. For example, as moral beings, if we could
build say, nuclear power stations that entailed zero-risk of accidents, rather than just a
small risk, we would presumably do so for moral reasons. Zero-risk nuclear power is
not possible at present, and may never be, but safety improvements are being pursued
(Lake, Bennett, Kotek 2002); the pursuit of goals is ideological. The decision not to
build or use a certain system or type of system entails zero safety risk from that
system or type. Logically, this option exists. Arguments that the risks of not using a
system leave no real decision to be made are often convincing at first, but on closer
examination, reveal a dubious “logic”. Beings able to manipulate nature are often able
to create alternatives, but may only try if they are required to. A decision to avoid a
course of action always invites us to consider alternative courses that we might never
have explored otherwise. For example, alternatives to nuclear energy have turned out
to be more interesting than might have been imagined in the early nuclear age, e.g.
gas-fired power stations and wind energy.
Safety thinking cannot find full expression in uninterpreted numbers: estimates and
measures of risk have no intrinsic significance; they only acquire meaning when
interpreted from ideological perspectives. Conscious or unconscious predispositions
toward the acceptability or not of certain risks must pre-exist any estimation or
measurement. Without our preconceptions, some of which may not be fully
articulated, statistics would mean very little to us. For example, consider systems A
and B each of which will cause one death in 10,000 hours of operation. We cannot
judge whether this risk level is “acceptable” until we know what A and B actually do:
if A is a helicopter, the figure might be acceptable: it is close to the current fatality
rate in any case (Iseler & De Maio 2001). If B is only a digital watch, the figure seems
absurd.
Furthermore, what one might think of as “objective” measures of risk depend entirely
upon our subjective willingness to live with risk. The nature of this subjectivity is
concealed by the surface objectivity of statistics. For example, experts view risk as
having two separate aspects to be estimated: likelihood (probability) of an accident
and severity of an accident (van der Meulen 2000, p. 245). A close questioning of the
supposed independence of likelihood and severity leads to some interesting
conclusions. A measured probability of an accident, against which an estimate of
likelihood is ultimately assessed, cannot be determined until the system lifetime has
ended. However, this “objective” measure can itself be determined by the severity of
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accidents. For example, suppose that an airliner crashes on its first passenger flight.
Consider two possible futures: a) political pressure keeps the aircraft flying and it
goes on to build up an enormous number of accident-free flight hours; b) the crash is
used as a reason for cancelling the aircraft programme. The different lifetimes make
the “objective” probability of an accident per flight hour very different in each case;
but the system lifetime is dependent upon the political will to keep using the system.
Concorde provides a concrete example. A recent crash transformed Concorde from
one of the safest aeroplanes in terms of flying hours into one of the most dangerous
(Daily Telegraph 2000); the political will existed to keep Concorde flying; if it had
not, Concorde would have remained a statistically “dangerous” aircraft, at least to
those who did not question the nature of the sample space from which the
measurements were taken. As far as statistical measures of accidents-per-unit-time are
concerned, the size of the sample space is determined by our willingness to carry on
living with the perceived risk; but this willingness is not uniform.
Thus it seems unavoidable that the complex system of power relations in our society
is a determinant of our risk acceptance decisions. For example, public perception is
enormously powerful in a democracy: thus public pride in the achievement that
Concorde represents, and most of all, the view of customers that the benefits and
status of Concorde travel outweigh the risks, has kept the aircraft in use after a
disaster. Hence although a certain amount of freedom is necessary for the pursuit of
subjective visions, the power to impose a vision is also necessary. Freedom is
simultaneously opened up and limited by differentials of power in our society.
On DERIDASC, we study differing ideological visions as fictional narratives.
Interpreting the hardest of hard evidence involves going from what we know
scientifically to what we should do as a consequence. Without some underlying vision
of how things will turn out, this process would be reducible to the “naturalistic
fallacy” in ethics, that is, the derivation of an “ought” from an “is” (Thompson 1999).
A narrative vision is also needed to structure different goals into a coherent
framework. The hypothesis of interest to DERIDASC is that narratives can only be
formulated in language, so that the inherited conventions of language and narrative
limit the form and scope of our narratives. We are not wholly free to think “outside”
language. Thus safety engineering is subject to a key deconstructive dilemma: our
language gives us a certain freedom of thought, but its systematic conventions also
inescapably limit that freedom.
2.2 Safety Engineering As Science
Like many other disciplines, safety engineering aspires to be scientific. Scientific and
mathematical methods are vital to technical progress and can increase safety. Yet the
scientific method can only discover evidence, whilst safety thinking is concerned with
entirely unscientific questions about the value of human life, health, the environment,
and utility. It was argued above that even when the input data is undeniable, and the
suggested course of action seems obvious, a decision remains an interpretation in the
light of a set of interests; it is never a matter of discovered truth. It depends on whose
views are canvassed, who decides on the relative value of different views, who cares
about the decision and who does not, who is adjudged an expert and who is not, and
who has decision-making power and who does not.
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What determines our willingness to keep using a system in the face of the perceived
severity of its failure? We might postulate our perception of benefits, previous safety,
low probability of failure, feelings of having no choice (the alternatives seem worse),
the profit motive, ideology, or just plain inertia; but clearly, our predispositions
toward certain types of risk are essential if we are to interpret risk estimates at all.
There is no objective standpoint from which to judge whether a risk is acceptable or
not. Yet we also know that our predispositions can deceive us, that they are risk-laden
in themselves.
We are in a logical ‘double-bind’: the human values necessary to endow our concern
for safety with significance also threaten that concern with relativism and
meaninglessness. Not only do our perceptions entail the risk that we “see what we
want to see” when we make decisions, but they also tend to change with time and
circumstances, making it problematic to place absolute trust in them.
What moral standpoint should safety thinkers adopt in the moral relativism vs.
absolutism debate (Edgar 1997, Chapter 1)? Are there a priori principles of safety
thinking that could never be denied? Because language is the technology with which
we harness meaning to serve our purposes, we will be unable to avoid these
philosophical questions in the course of the DERIDASC study.
2.3 Safety Thinking And Safety Culture
As Leveson notes (Leveson 1995, p. 54), key factors in cases of safety engineering
failure are overconfidence and complacency. If so, then complacency about our
conceptual frameworks for thinking about safety is something to be wary of. Hence
our view that safety engineering language can be viewed as a “technology” for safety
thinking that entails its own risks.
To decide that a course of action is worth pursuing, experts will require confidence in
the likelihood of arguments in favour of it. The judgement that all the arguments
against are unconvincing is implied (even if the space of them is not easy to explore).
Nonetheless, every argument will involve risk-laden predictions. Risk estimation
technology is itself risky.
We should not place total confidence in any conceptual framework we use to
represent risk because doing so implies that its concepts are changeless and its
relations undeniable. In other words, there is an implicit claim that it faithfully
represents a priori principles of safety thinking. All ideologies would like to lay claim
to a basis in natural truth, but the reality is that fixed, universal and undeniable
principles of thinking are philosophically problematic. The search for foundational
principles for thinking (the so-called “synthetic a priori propositions”, such as
Descartes famous “Cogito Ergo Sum”) appears, to postmodernists at least, to have
failed (Critchley 2001). The view adopted on DERIDASC is that there is no reason to
place anything other than provisional trust in the way experts currently think about
safety. Any “discipline” of thought is caught-up in a perpetual process of self-
interpretation and self-reinterpretation and is thus inherently unstable.
DERIDASC 1 6 24/04/2002
On DERIDASC we might characterise risks that arise from habits of thought, that is,
risks due to a particular way of thinking about a problem, as “meta-risks”. In this
project, we experiment with the hypothesis that meta-risks can be diagnosed through
analysis of the language used in safety engineering literature.
The acceptance of a safety system depends on the arguments and judgements made by
experts. In addition to other activities (e.g. experience of practice and witnessed
demonstrations), a great deal of the day-to-day effort of safety experts goes into the
construction, distribution, interpretation, and re-inscription (e.g. in review articles) of
texts. Through writing and interpreting texts, safety experts exercise their technology.
In exercising it, they also develop it. Thus safety experts construct what is termed a
“discourse” (Abrams, 1999 p. 66).
A discourse has a special terminology, rules of style (stylistics), and procedures for
determining the considerations that are admissible or inadmissible in debates.
Prevailing attitudes derived from our discourse underlie our habits of reading, writing,
speech, and interpretation; but an interesting feature of language is that it closes off
certain lines of thought as a function of the way it enables others.
A discourse is concretely reflected in its texts. By examining safety texts closely, as
one might examine literary or philosophical texts, we can perhaps gain insights into
the nature of the meta-risks of interpretation in safety engineering. Our particular
concern will be with situations where inarticulated habits of language and thought
may possibly be at work.
From a safety assessment perspective, DERIDASC may suggest ways of reading
‘between’ the lines when trying to assess an organisations safety culture. The
perception that an organisation has a proactive safety culture seems to be an essential
component of public and regulatory confidence. There is more to safety culture than
rigorously ensuring that the required minima are applied (although this is important).
Safety engineering seems to demand a culture that values continuous improvement
and professional practices that reflect on their own effectiveness. The hypothesis of
the project members is that safety experts already include safety culture as a factor in
their expert judgements. The sheer volume and the technical nature of much safety
documentation makes it hard to discern cultural issues in the organisations that
produce it.  Nonetheless, an hypothesis of the DERIDASC project is that safety
assessors already make such judgements, and that this is one of the more elusive
aspects of their expertise. Safety experts may not be aware that deconstruction might
provide a philosophical framework that concretises the intuitive aspects of safety
judgement.
2.4 Determinacy and Indeterminacy in Interpretation
The difference between a person reading a text and a computer executing a program is
striking; the computers interpretative framework (its CPU) is not altered by the
program, whereas the reader’s interpretive framework (world view) can be altered by
a new text, and by subsequent re-readings (note that when programs are read by
people, interpretative indeterminacies, often troublesome ones, re-assert themselves).
DERIDASC 1 7 24/04/2002
Indeterminacies affect writing and reading alike. Writing and reading are not such
distinct activities as we may suppose: readers think in words and annotate texts;
indeed, reading could be viewed as a form of mental transcription; many professional
authors proverbially admit that they need to write to find out what they think. Texts
make interpretations of other texts both explicitly (e.g. references) and implicitly (e.g.
influences). Deconstructive thinkers take the view that when a particular subject
produces an interpretation that has a particular form, that interpretation can be written
out as a new text to be interpreted by other subjects. This process of ‘re-inscription’ is
the dynamic of a discourse, and it is endless in principle; it is in progress as you read
this text.
The first source of indeterminacy in interpretation derives from the subject doing the
interpreting. Some philosophers and literary theorists have argued that a subject is
free to interpret a text in any way at all, no matter how widely the interpretation
differs from the intentions of the author or a particular society of readers; but this is
idea is problematic for several reasons.
Firstly, the form of a subjective interpretation is constrained by the nature of the
subject. Subjects commonly “constrain” themselves by adopting explicit ideological
positions or impersonal professional roles. Furthermore, a reader’s understanding of a
text is a phenomena of their subjective consciousness. Unconscious influences may be
at work in the interpretive process. For example, a subject’s interpretation may well
be related to previously assimilated, but long forgotten, interpretations; some of these
influences may come from outside the discourse at hand.
Secondly, if a subject wishes others to see their interpretation of a text as compelling,
that interpretation must be moulded to the expectations of those other subjects to
some extent. In literary terms, a text has an “implied reader” (Abrams 1999, p. 257).
For example, the author of an advanced text about safety will have ideas about what
an advanced safety expert will know, and how that implied reader will respond to
recognised linguistic conventions and cues. Advanced safety experts expect that an
interpretation should be based on identifiable evidence, either described within the
text or in a referenced external source; but if the author writes an introductory text the
strictness of these conventions will relax to some extent in favour of more general
referencing conventions. Furthermore, some technical documents are explicitly
addressed to particular professional roles (a safety auditor, a system operator) or to a
team with a coherent function.
However, the explicitly declared positions that subjects adopt within their discourse
are not necessarily the whole story. For example, personal relationships can influence
a text, as authors and readers often know one another, and know one another’s views.
The boundaries of a discourse may seem easy to define in terms of expectations of
professional behaviour, but the restriction of influences on that behaviour is another
matter (the boundary is tested explicitly in interdisciplinary studies like DERIDASC).
Another potential constraint on the interpretative process, and one of particular
interest in deconstruction, is the possibility of discourse-wide unconscious and
inarticulated motives constraining the space of what is recognisably “within” the
discourse, and therefore constraining what is “thinkable” in it. Deconstruction
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challenges the linguistic conventions of a discourse to test whether they reveal
unconscious prejudices, over-simplifications in thought, blindness to pertinent issues.
Finally, we must not forget the text itself. Literary theorists have drawn attention to
the means by which the structure of the text has certain effects upon the reader’s
perceptions, even though these may be unconscious, and not perhaps what the author
intended (Eagleton 1996, Chapter 2). In the “Reader-Response” style of literary
criticism, each text is viewed as a framework that has to be “concretised” by the mind
of the reader, rather as a template class is “concretised” in a computer program by the
instantiation of parameters. In practice, the ‘skeleton’ which the text provides for the
experience of reading does not leave the reader free to imagine that anything at all can
be read into it. For example, consider how much harder it is to break off reading in the
middle of a sentence as opposed to breaking off at the end of a section; how confusing
long sentences can become; the varied uses that texts make of spacing conventions.
Furthermore, as texts are based on other texts, they either adopt their linguistic habits
or adopt new habits in reaction (e.g. the ‘political incorrectness’ of the universal “he”
is now generally avoided).
Provisionally then, we can imagine a space of recognisable and convincing
(re)interpretations, defined through the language, values and disputations current in
safety discourse. Even if an interpretation is an explicit rejection of a consensus view,
it depends upon that view for its perceived relevance, its professional interest, and its
emotional force. It will make some use of the conventions of that discourse, even if
only to subvert them in some way. Subversion of a textual genre (e.g. a satire) is a
common way for literary authors to make their mark; but in technical documents and
engineering texts the idea of subverting recognised styles of technical writing may
seem bizarre. Nonetheless, if one can speak of philosophical texts as “technical” texts,
Derrida is both famous and notorious for doing just this.
The activity is justified by the following observation: despite our recognition that
most texts recognisably belong to a certain discourse and a genre within that
discourse, and are constrained by its conventions, it is wrong to suppose that
subjective interpretations are absolutely constrained by the text and what peers agree
is recognisably ‘in’ it. The space of acceptable texts/interpretations is not really stable.
The recognised boundaries of a discourse are always “in” deconstruction; otherwise,
no new insights would ever find their way into our discourse, and ideas would never
change. The unfamiliar, the difficult, the previously unknown, and the alien could
never influence our system of thought. Postmodern philosophers claim that the
“condition of possibility” of an interpretation is that different interpretations are
always possible. Among other things, this view implies that there can be no “final
interpretation” of a text, beyond which readers cannot make further interpretations;
hence there can be no ‘closed’ and stable system of discourse.
Instead, new ideas are introduced within the period of struggle we call “controversy”
as social groups attempt to assimilate them into previous conceptual frameworks. This
assimilation might involve changes to both the new idea and the old conceptual
framework. It is rare indeed for a conceptual framework to be totally replaced by a
new idea (e.g. the Theory of Relativity has not “replaced” Newtonian Mechanics); but
it is also rare for a system of thought to remain stable and unquestioned for very long.
Indeed, the simple notion that a new interpretation either is or is not a member of the
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set of valid interpretations is highly misleading. The relation between different ways
of seeing the world is always, at least initially, characterised by mutual contradiction
and ideological struggle: it is often tense, emotive, political, and alogical. It involves
the exercise of various kinds of power, e.g. the ‘force’ of an argument, appeals to
people ‘outside’ the discourse, and sometimes the use of political power. It also
involves creative imagination: the example of Einstein is instructive; we should not
forget how subversive Einstein’s imaginative “thought experiments” may have
seemed to the professional physicists of his time; but the thought experiment led
directly to the seminal theory of relativity and is now ubiquitous: in fact the very
strangeness of modern physics seems to demand imaginative as well as mathematical
interpretations, and we now perceive this as entirely normal.
Our imagined “space of recognisable interpretations” then is more like a fuzzy set
than discrete set, but perhaps even more difficult define; it does not stabilise. What the
postmodern philosopher would call ‘openness’ is a necessary condition for the
admission of new ideas. Thinking is not viewed as a process that is under the direct
and complete control of the thinker. It involves an openess to the unknown that is very
much a concern of deconstruction. It is also a point of contact between deconstruction
and safety engineering: for example, safety engineers think of systems in terms of risk
rather than imagining that “safe” and “dangerous” can be viewed as definite logical
propositions; they use statistical and mathematical methods, but would not deny that
their hazard analyses are bounded by the experience of the analysts and the breadth
and depth of their imaginative thinking.
It is doubtful that disciplines of thought, such as those developed in logic and
mathematics, can accurately model what occurs when we attempt to introduce the
unknown as a factor in our thinking, when it introduces itself. This does not imply
that using logic and mathematics makes ‘open’ thinking impossible, far from it; many
of Derrida’s deconstructive strategies are based on ideas with counterparts in logic
such as undecidability, incompleteness and recursion. Rather deconstruction focuses
on the idea that language of any sort can be as much a useful means of channelling
thought as a way of preventing it. Deconstructive thought supposes that certain
determinacies of language might blind us to indeterminacies that we actually face. It
hypothesises that at its margins, language encourages a subconscious indifference to
certain issues, which therefore escape our notice, but when uncovered can be both
problematic and important.
2.5 The Text “in” Deconstruction
The existence or non-existence of an objectively verifiable ‘final interpretation’ of a
text is one of the most debated issues in philosophy and literary theory. Safety
judgement, which involves the analysis of textual arguments, would be made far
easier if we knew that a final interpretation could be arrived at in principle. The
postmodern perspective is emphatically that the final interpretation of a text does not
exist; but whatever one’s own view, philosophy as a whole has failed to settle the
question. The question itself raises the further question of the ideological reasons that
drive people to take up the positions in the debate that they do.
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Some of the reasons that the interpretive process is so indeterminate are fairly
obvious. Even though an author tries to appear as dispassionate as possible in a text,
some slip of convention may entirely undermine previous faith in the text, causing the
reader to skip passages or give up altogether. It is also possible to read a text without
ever fully grasping some aspect that the author either thought would be obvious, or
was not even aware of. Literary theory is replete with examples where aspects of a
text escape readers for long periods of time (see section 3.2). Such possibilities are
inherent the reading process and they are a source of risks and benefits. For example,
some aspect of what I write here, the importance of which I am presently unaware,
might catch your interest, even though you only started reading the report because
someone else is making you, or because there is nothing else to hand and nothing
better to do. You might fix on a train of thought of which I am presently unaware and
start to write it down yourself; and much good or ill could come of the process.
In recent years, the ground of the philosophical debate about final interpretations has
shifted from the idea that texts have no meaning, to the Derridean idea that in fact
they have too much. Perhaps there is always a possibility of meanings that an author
did not intend creeping into the text and they will become evident if the text is
examined carefully enough; in writing we always say more than, and other than, we
intend to say. The “always” is an important qualifier: if the unintended meanings
never run out, the notion that authors or readers can ever be in full possession of the
meaning of a text is doubtful. Even though there may be a law of diminishing returns
in interpretation, residual meanings can always be grasped by readers, and followed-
up. Derrida (1981) calls the phenomenon “dissemination”, implying metaphorically
that unintended meanings suggest fruitful lines of enquiry rather than marginal
distractions.
Deconstruction suggests a concern with the unspoken foundational structures of safety
language, thought and texts. This often involves the exploration of the considerations
that are viewed as peripheral in the discourse, or marginal in the individual text. This
is a more indirect strategy than the attempt to confirm or refute what a text appears to
say. However, the indirect strategy can be illuminating. Deconstructive thinkers have
found that foundational structures of language and thought all too often turn out to be
arbitrary structures, rather than being based on any evident, or even likely, truths.
Deconstruction has revealed a tendency to confuse the arbitrary structuring of
concepts with natural truth in the texts of many great thinkers, from Plato to John
Searle. On DERIDASC, we ask whether safety texts reveal any similar tendencies and
whether we can gain any new perspectives from this.
Deconstructive thinking is openly speculative. It turns away from the idea of what
specific concepts finally “mean” and towards exploring ideas about what they should
become next. To find out, deconstructive thinkers apply recursive questioning
techniques; they are fascinated by conundrums such as the status of the concept as a
concept and the concept of metaphor being itself metaphorical. Perhaps the
vocabulary of concepts that safety engineering provides (e.g. “the chain of events”,
“the primary cause”, “as low as reasonably practicable”) partly conceal more
appropriate concepts from us. Creative openess to the unknown and the overlooked
are not foreign to safety engineering, or to system engineering in general.
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3 Problem Description: The Unreliable Text
A commonsense view of interpretation might be that we work out what the author was
trying to convey in the text and then decide whether or not we agree with it. As far as
judging safety advice or a safety argument goes, this might seem to be all we need to
know about authorship and readership. However, this commonsense view has proved
problematic in the discipline of “literary theory”, which we define for the purposes of
this study as the philosophy of literature. In this section we try to destabilise the
commonsense view, showing that it places too much trust in both authors and readers.
3.1 Confidence in Authors
When interpreting a text we face the question of what should be admissible evidence
for our interpretation. In principle, we can draw on the text itself, other texts, our own
experience, what we know of the intentions of the authors, the historical and social
background of the text and its author, indeed anything that we feel subjectively to be
relevant, both whilst reading the text and thinking about it afterwards; we have
already argued that the field is not really so open, and yet neither is it determinate
(Section 2.4).
Explicit claims that certain considerations should be ruled out of the interpretive
process in a determinate way are hotly contested in literary theory. In this section we
examine the various failures of philosophers to treat texts as fully determined
“vessels” carrying an author’s meaning to the reader. The ideas in this debate are
important to safety engineering because they suggest that authorial intention is by no
means all we should focus upon when evaluating a text. Indeed, there is support for
the view that a mistrust of authorial intention, as we might expect to find in
“criticism”, is inescapable.
A classic example of how literary theory has tried, and failed, to narrow the scope of
textual interpretation by ruling out certain sources of evidence can be seen in the
debate about the so-called “affective” and “intentional” fallacies in literary criticism
(see Abrams 1999, p. 4 and p. 126 respectively). The question is whether the
“affective” properties of a text (that is, its psychological effects upon its readers)
coupled with evidence from outside the text itself about what the author “intended”
these effects to be are sufficient for an interpretive judgement. In 1946, critics W.K.
Wimsatt and M. Bearsley claimed that the affective fallacy led to impressionism and
relativism by reposing meaning only in the subjective responses of readers, and that
the intentional fallacy shifted attention away from close readings of the text itself, in
favour of a diagnosis of the historical and personal circumstances of the author. They
argued that the two fallacies tended to reduce poetry to a form of autobiography of
what we might call “great souls”: if one understands the author’s intentions, one
understands the text, and if the author has a “great soul” the text will be great.
The rejection of this view was central to a literary movement known as “New
Criticism”. New Criticism attempted a more “objective” approach to literary criticism,
analysing texts as freestanding works of art, with minimal reference to the social and
historical context and interpretations proffered by systematic thinkers such as
philosophers and political theorists. The most influential “new critic” in Britain was
DERIDASC 1 12 24/04/2002
FR Leavis, who argued the need for “close reading” of the text as an escape from the
idle whimsy and subjective prejudice he saw in the writings of previous generations
of critics (see Abrams 1999 p 181).
Other critical approaches have also attempted to divorce the text from its historical,
social and autobiographical contexts, for example, the “phenomenological criticism”
based on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In Husserl’s “phenomenology” it is
assumed that the foundation of knowledge is the mind’s intuitive and subjective
experience of the world: our subjective experience is undeniably what is real (critics
of the view call it “solipsism”). As Eagleton (1996, p. 50) puts it, Husserl attempted to
create “a science of subjectivity”. Phenomenological critics used this “science” to
analyse the style and devices of a text rigorously, on the assumption that this would
reveal the author’s consciousness at the time of writing, arguing that only this was
relevant to an understanding of the text.
Phenomenology and the New Criticism attempted to view a literary text as a
hermetically-sealed object, a system isolated from the outside world watched over by
a God-like author with a coherent consciousness and intentions. It is within these
schools that difficult-to-interpret concepts such as “organic unity” emerged.  In the
end, the attempt to disqualify external political and social factors, like for example the
effects of the social conditioning on the author and readership, as though texts could
recursively define their own rules of appreciation, failed signally.
3.2 The “Death” of the Author
The so-called “death of the author” in literary criticism marked the passing of the
view of the text as a closed system under authorial control (see Abrams 1999, p. 240)
The “post-structuralist” critics of the 1950s and 1960s, valuing linguistic and
analytical rigour, began to find that previous close readings had been not nearly close
enough.
A famous early case concerned the reputation of Jean Racine (1639-99), an amusing
discussion of which is given in (Thody & Course 1999). Racine’s tragedies occupy a
place in French Literature analogous to that of Shakespeare’s tragedies in English
Literature. Racine was a master of the techniques of fine writing. His craftsmanship
and disciplined employment of literary rules was highly explicit; for example, his
plays scrupulously observe Aristotle’s dictum that the action of a drama should
happen in one place over twenty four hours and contain no subplots. Racine wrote
each play in prose before translating it into verse and even went so far as to write the
second line of each rhyming couplet out first in order to avoid “forced” rhymes. All
his stories are drawn from classical Greece and Rome. To the French literary
establishment of the 1960s, Racine was the master technician of French classicism.
The finer points of his technique have been admired and imitated for centuries.
In the late sixties, critic Roland Barthes caused a furore by rejecting the view of
Racine as a “master” of his craft. Barthes managed to identify a recurring subplot in
Racine’s plays. In this subplot party A has power over party B, and loves party B, but
is not loved by B in return. How could the meticulous Jean Racine so clumsily have
broken his self-imposed rule of avoiding subplots? To an outraged literary
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establishment, but delighted students of late 60’s French universities, Barthes argued
that Racine must have been entirely unaware of what he was doing. In fact, Barthes
argued, Racine’s subplot is explicable in terms of his personal experiences of religion
(Jansenism) and court politics, not in terms of his subject matter, which was meant to
be presented impersonally.
This controversy shook the idea of the professional author as the trustworthy
wordsmith, and started what has become a tradition of mistrust of authors. This in turn
has led to critical analyses of readers themselves. A notable example of such literary
theory is found in the work of Marxist philosopher and critic Louis Althusser.
Althusser developed the idea of “interpellation” which proposes that by repeatedly
addressing readers in a certain way, authors can manipulate themselves and their
readers into an acceptance of the prevailing capitalist ideology (see Abrams p. 151).
In recent literary criticism, the techniques of close reading have survived, but the view
of a work as an autonomous system that encapsulates authorial intention has not. A
school known as “Reader Response Theory” (Culler 1997, p. 63) has re-asserted the
view that the experience of the reader is the meaning of a literary text is (presumably
then, the literal meaning of a boring text is “boredom”). Furthermore, the 1980’s saw
the rise of a “New Historicism” which repositions the literary text as the product of
historical forces, which it is the business of the critic to uncover, although the
technique of close reading is retained (Abrams 1999, p 189).
Modern schools of textual analysis have concluded that what matters is what comes
out of our heads onto the page, not whether or not we meant it to. In this climate,
authors of safety texts should not be surprised if unintended interpretations are
evidenced in their writing, and if “I didn’t really mean it” seems a weak defence of
inadvertent self-contradiction and revelation.
3.3 Unreliable Authors and Safety Culture: An Example …
This section analyses a text that is highly revealing of things that its author probably
did not intend. The exercise will permit the introduction of “deconstruction” in an
informal way. The quoted text comes from a short advice document for the engineers
of a supplier of safety systems. The document was freely distributed at a recent
seminar on the problems of information management and legal liability. The advice
given warns about the use that liability lawyers could make of evidence gleaned from
the text of emails.
This passage illustrates the apparent paradox that language is both, a) a treacherous
game in which we can appear to have said all kinds of things that we did not mean,
and b) an accidental snapshot of our real desires and intentions, in all their confusion
and possible contradictoriness. This problem, much debated by philosophers of
language, is perhaps what the advisor is trying to indicate to would-be authors of
indiscreet email. Portions that could be judged “revealing” have been underlined:
“People appear to be less inhibited when constructing email messages compared to
other forms of communication, particularly paper. They are more likely to express an
opinion using terse more colourful language. Email is almost treated as a casual
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conversation by many. Messages are more likely to be direct and to the point, cutting
message length to a minimum. The following is a REAL example of such an email
with key details masked for obvious reasons:
‘Gentlemen
At this time in our negotiations with ????? on the other changes they are
requesting and the impact these may have on the ????? Software Development
Programme, it is important that ????? do not get any inkling of potential
safety problems with the delivered systems. Therefore, can all parties please
ensure that discussion of these matters is strictly limited and is never raised in
any forum where ????? is present.’
The ability to quickly compose an email and rapidly send it removes an element of
checking and the cooling off period we normally get with other more traditional
written forms of communication. Emails thus tend to be a better reflection of a
person’s thoughts potentially revealing their ‘true’ character at the time they created
the document.
The short length and computer typeface of an email makes it easy for lawyers to read
and analyse such documents compared to hand written text. Fewer words also mean
that each word can have more significance and are (sic) easier to place in context.
Shorter documents can have more impact as evidence, with documents being enlarged
so that they can easily be displayed to a jury. Visible (to conventional software
application packages) electronically stored files also offer the advantage of being
capable of being rapidly and accurately searched. When significant numbers of
messages have to be checked this is a major bonus to the tracker.”
The passage itself is a piece of literary criticism in a sense. A curious feature of
textual criticism is that demonstrating a critical technique invites recursive application
as much as a decision on validity, especially if the reader is predisposed to take
exception to the apparent message. As well as taking in the facts presented in the
passage (e.g. that people write emails quickly and without thinking), we can apply to
the advice the same technique that it applies to its example email.
Notice the potentially interminable nature of this recursive process. Presumably, the
author of the passage read the quoted email at some point, felt according to
professional preconceptions or actual circumstances that it was entirely inappropriate,
and decided to quote it as an example of what not to write in an email. Following on
from this, I, the author of this section read the author’s passage, decided according to
my own professional preconceptions and circumstances (it was a “gift” to research on
the deconstruction of safety engineering), that it represented everything that worried
me about the attitude of safety engineers to issues of language, and therefore decided
to ignore “what it actually says” in favour of the test of recursive self-application. By
extension, there could well be readers who quote this document as an example of the
risks of funding interdisciplinary studies to cast doubt on things that safety engineers
feel they understand well enough and so on.
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What is apparently criticised in the advice is a sentiment implied in the example
email: namely that profit is far more important than safety; hence, if a potentially
dangerous product could negatively affect sales, one must not tell customers about the
dangers. An attitude emerges that is something like “who knows, you may by chance
get away with it; then nobody will be any the wiser and you’ll be laughing all the way
to the bank”. Most readers will see how the email could be interpreted in this way.
However, consider a self-application test that runs as follows: the supposedly
“critical” advice endorses the implied sentiment entirely, and is filled with evidence
of this. At no point does the author disapprove of the sentiment expressed in the
email. The purpose of the “cooling off” period is evidently to allow more time to
conceal one’s true intentions artfully and effectively, and this what the advisor is
implying that readers should do. The author says the email is a “REAL” email, so
safety engineers are actually working to this “safety second to profit” principle. The
advisor also says that key details are “masked for obvious reasons”; these obvious
reasons are that if ????? ever found out what was going on, they would be able to
punish the guilty without mercy. As the organisation in question obviously has a
defective safety culture, this would be justice indeed. In fact, the advisor is
compounding the bungled conspiracy of silence begun in the email. In writing
“advice”, he is contributing to a corporate culture that values the concealment of
safety concerns where these concerns might threaten commercial profit. The fact that
he then gives his “advice” out at public seminars only compounds his incoherent
attitude to the concealment of safety concerns.
Far fetched? Yet there is evidence in the passage to support the interpretation and to
support a good many others. On closer inspection, we might ask whether the “advice”
given is coherently motivated.
Deconstructive thinkers predict that our overall interpretation will hinge on our
interpretation of certain binary distinctions. These distinctions may not always be
explicitly drawn in the text itself, and may at first seem marginal; but on close
examination they will prove not only crucial, but deeply problematic. Here is a
“deconstructive reading”.
The author notes that people “appear to be less inhibited” when writing email; this
probably means that the author thinks, but is not absolutely sure, that people writing
email are less inhibited than usual (rather than meaning “they just seem to be less
inhibited, when in fact they are not”); but how is what “seems” different to what “is”?
What one makes of the distinction between “appearance” and “reality”, and how the
distinction relates to one’s own viewpoint will affect one’s interpretation. For
example, when the liability lawyers check through emails and electronic documents,
are they trying to reconstruct the “reality” of events, or are they trying to construct a
preconceived “appearance” that will win them their case? Do they filter out the
inconvenient “appearances” and seize on convenient “appearances” rather than seek
the “reality”? How are these activities actually different? Is the distinction between a
“real” state of affairs and mere “appearances” a sustainable one? (Lenin famously
remarked on the “reality of appearances”).
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Self-interest may slip into the interpretive process of binary distinction. For example,
if you think the liability lawyers are “bad guys” concerned only with constructing
“appearances”, then documents that are “more likely to be direct and to the point,
cutting message length to a minimum” are a menace; what you require instead are
reams of impenetrable bureaucratic techno-babble, so painfully abstruse and long-
winded that on the mere principle of reasonable doubt, no jury in the land would ever
convict you if it entailed going through the documentation. Neither are “casual
conversations” or “heated, revealing, and prolonged responses” desirable: much better
to act dispassionately, say little, and in general prefer to say nothing at all. Liability
lawyers will take innocent passages in your texts out of context without mercy; thus
searchable electronic documents are also a menace.
A change in a reader’s circumstances might lead to a totally opposed interpretation.
Suppose the liability lawyers are on your side: you are bringing a case against a
supplier who concealed safety concerns from you, with tragic consequences. In this
case, the quoted passage is liable to be read as an indictment of the corporate culture
of the offending organisation. The liability lawyers become fearless defenders of
justice and pursuers of the truth (admittedly, not a role that they usually play in the
popular imagination).
Being more charitable to the author of the passage than either of these interpretations
involves questioning the very nature of the distinctions upon which the passage
depends. For example, the author employs the “use vs. mention” distinction in the
phrase “potentially revealing their ‘true’ character at the time they created the
document”, as is indicated by his quotation marks. What the author could be implying
is that “casual conversation” and uninhibited thoughts do not reveal our true character
and motivations; in fact, they may lead the suspicious to misunderstand us ill-
advisedly. Perhaps the email author would feel ashamed and revoke his course of
action given a “cooling off period”. In his text, the author of the passage is humanely
pointing out that the email could misrepresent its author.
Of course, this view itself is problematic; if we do not reveal our true selves in “casual
conversation”, in “heated”, “prolonged” and “revealing” (!) debates, when do we?
We return to the question of what constitutes our “real” selves and what constitutes a
mere “appearance” of our selves. An endless list of questions is raised. For example,
when we uncover a “reality” behind an “appearance”, what makes it more than just
another “appearance”? Is anything ever more than the sum of its “appearances”? What
intrinsic properties do “realities” have that separate them from appearances? What is
our real business in safety engineering? As professionals, we try to adopt an
appearance called professionalism; but does it ever become a reality?
This out-of-control explosion of questions and diversity of interpretation derives from
the fact that the passage itself can be seen to enact the technique of incompetent
concealment that it tries to condemn. When I put this argument to the author at the
seminar he smiled good-humouredly, and shrugged helplessly. He was caught, as the
cliché goes, “in the web of language”. The deconstructive view, to put the matter
roughly (and therefore to distort it), is that all texts “betray” authorial control in this
way. As we shall see, Derrida goes so far as to claim that the illusion of clear meaning
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we might get on a first reading is only possible because of the habitual suppression,
rather than absence, of different meanings.
Repeated and rigorous re-reading of the advice reduces rather than increases
confidence that the author was “in control” of what he wrote. Further evidence of a
certain incoherence in the author’s attitude can be found in the title of the article
“Why the Litigation Lawyers love (or hate) email”. We are left wondering why it
worth pointing out that emails can be indiscreet, and we may draw conclusions that
would shock the author.
In the popular phrase the passage is “open to interpretation”: which means that if one
looks at it closely enough, from enough different viewpoints, it dissolves into
incoherence and undecidability. The deconstructive term for this phenomenon is
“aporia”.
Deconstructive thinkers argue that aporia and the problematic nature of binary
distinctions (e.g. between “appearance” vs. “reality”) are universal phenomena. For
example, a postmodern philosopher might interject that since we exist in and change
with time we have no ‘true’ self; so any language that presupposes that we have is
doomed to incoherence given a deep enough analysis.
3.4 Binary Oppositions
If we knew what the advisor considered to be an “appearance” and what a “reality”,
we could produce his intended interpretation; but no definition is given. As
preposterous as it seems, from a piece of safety advice we find ourselves embroiled in
a debate that philosophers have carried on for centuries. For example, Russell used
the “appearance” vs. “reality” distinction as a starting point for his description of the
problems of philosophy as a whole (Russell 1912, Chapter 1).
Derrida proposes that binary oppositions impose a “hierarchy” of thought upon us;
one term of the opposition tends to be viewed as central and the other subordinate or
marginal, one pure, the other impure, one good, the other bad. Yet analysis of the
valuation often subverts it by showing that the hierarchy could be legitimately
reversed. For example, we can argue that “appearances” are better than “reality” if we
happen to prefer film, theatre, and fantasy to “real” life, and most of us do from time
to time (all these things are experiences as real as any other).
However, deconstruction aims to subvert more than simple unconscious habits of
thought. Deconstructive thinkers claim that each individual term of a binary
opposition is nothing except the asserted opposite of the other term, neither concept
having any “essence” of meaning, any existence that is independent of its opposite. If
we take one of the terms and try to define it, we find that we can only do so by
mentioning the other term, and vice versa. Each term contains what Derrida calls the
“trace” of its opposite: so in deconstructive thinking, concepts are impure, or to put it
another way, distinctions are always imposed, not “there”. A binary opposition is a
“construction” because it places an artificial boundary between two entities that
contain the trace of their so-called opposite. It falsely assumes the independence of
the terms from one another and imposes a hierarchy of preference upon them. The
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conceptual distinctions we think so valuable in Western thinking can be viewed as
potentially arbitrary and therefore problematic. Readers can try the theory out by
trying to define the essential difference between “reality” and “appearance” for
themselves.
Paradoxically, it is the philosophical necessity of clear distinctions that drives
deconstructive analysis. In the Afterword to the text of his famous dispute with John
Searle (Derrida 1977) Derrida rejects Searle’s claim that pathologically hard-to-
classify cases do not necessarily make binary oppositions invalid:
“I confirm it, for me, from the point of view of theory and of the concept “unless a
distinction can be made rigorous and precise it isn’t really a distinction.” Searle is
entirely right, for once, in attributing this “assumption” to me.”
In the same essay, Derrida distances himself from any notion that deconstruction is a
defence of vagueness and approximate thought:
“… what it [deconstruction] does is less to disturb them [binary oppositions] than to
bring into the open that which is disturbing them and menacing their consistency,
their order, their pertinence. But the deconstruction of binary and hierarchical
oppositions does not open the way to confusion, to “indistinction” … it leads instead
to an extreme complication, multiplication, explication of “precise and rigorous
distinctions”.
In essence, Derrida objects to binary oppositions that are not “fine-grained” enough.
He argues that such oppositions are inevitably threatened by the possibilities of time
and change: for example, one possibility is that their constant repetition in new
contexts causes their meaning to mutate (a possibility Derrida calls “iterability”, see
below Section 3.5); another is that things that do not “fit” the opposition are
discovered or brought into being.
3.5 Text and Context
A criticism of the suspicious interpretation of our example safety text might be that it
commits the proverbially dangerous sin of “taking words out of context”, both on our
part and the part of the advisor. In the example email, who is meant by “all parties”
and who is “?????”;  why is it necessary “at this time in our negotiations” to conceal
safety concerns from that party? For all we know, “?????” could be a person who
always faints at the mere mention of safety problems, and the email was written with
their well-being in mind; this is merely an implausible context from a certain point of
view, not an impossible one. Natural language is sensitive to context and philosophers
have expended a great deal of effort on trying to define what context is.
Texts seem to need context to be comprehensible. For example, it is in the nature of
quotation to extract a (sub)text from the textual aspect of its (con)text. I did not quote
the entire advice document; in the original there is text before and after the quoted
passage and a reading of this text might throw new light on what I have quoted. I
might then seek evidence from “outside” the document itself, gathering information
on the conditions under which it was produced. For example, the fact that the author
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wrote under pressure without really thinking about it might explain the ambiguity I
found; alternatively, you the reader might think that the problem is with my reading
and the context I made it in. Unfortunately, the process of reconstructing a context is
endless in principle: how do we know what to include and what to leave out? For
example, is the reason why the author was under pressure something to be included in
the context description?
Deconstruction argues for the philosophical inseparability of the text from its context.
Instead, the text itself forms part of its context, rendering the distinction between text
and context problematic. When texts are “removed” from their context (which of
course is not really possible), that is, when they are “iterated” in new contexts, the
effect can never be quite the same again. This alterability is inherent in the notion of
the text as an iterable (repeatable) structure. As Derrida (1977, p.62) famously put the
matter:
“Iterability alters, contaminating parasitically what it identifies and enables to repeat
“itself”; it leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is (already,
always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than what we
say and would have wanted to say, to understand something other than … etc”
When reading, we are caught up in a repositioning of the text in our own context.
Even attempts to project ourselves backward into the context of the author, the
intended readership, or to isolate the text from context, as the New Criticism tried to
do, are projections that do not release us from our own context and its contingencies.
There is nothing “context free” in a text even its physical nature, (e.g. it can degrade
over time causing problems for future generations of interpreters). A key idea in
deconstructive thought is that the context is dynamic: it includes time and the text
itself. It can be “halted” only intellectually, by a decision that enough is known, which
must always be just that – decision. Derrida (1977, p. 131) puts the matter thus:
“The reconstitution of a context can never be perfect and irreproachable even though
it is a regulative ideal in the ethics of reading, of interpretation, or of discussion. But
since this idea is unattainable … the simple recalling of a context is never a gesture
that is neutral, innocent, transparent, disinterested.”
A key idea in deconstruction is that the text and context are inseperable: the text
forms part of the context and the context is already within it. The contexts of various
readers are in fact just aspects of an idealised “totalising” context. Derrida’s most
famous saying is “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”, which he explains thus:
“One of the definitions of what is called deconstruction would be the effort to take
this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest possible attention
to context, and thus to the incessant movement of recontextualisation. The phrase,
which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, means
… there is nothing outside context”.
The necessity of context makes a text into an “open” structure not fully
comprehensible as a coherent and independent system. Furthermore, although it may
provide the illusion of doing so, the text cannot be said to allow direct access to the
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objects and ideas it discusses. The process of interpretation always mediates meaning
in such a way as to destabilise it to some degree.
An interpretation of a text may seem subjectively more convincing than any other, but
it is important not to confuse contextual consensus with natural and evident truth. Our
own social context and prejudices could pollute our writing and reading in ways we
do not suspect. Perhaps the reality we aim to capture is somehow distorted by the
nature of language. This is the problem deconstructive philosophy has with
oppositional thinking: for example, most of us see “realities” as more valuable than
“appearances” without necessarily realising that the distinction is a difficult one, and
that we have may have come to accept it only through habit. That acceptance is a
suppressed aspect of our context.
Derrida does not however dismiss the value of the concept of “objectivity”, seeing it
the broadest possible context from which to observe the world:
“What is called “objectivity”, scientific for instance (in which I firmly believe in a
given situation), imposes itself only within a context which is extremely vast, old,
powerfully established, stabilised or rooted in a network of conventions (for instance
those of language) and yet which still remains a context. We can call “context” the
entire “real-history-of-the-world,” if you like, in which this value of objectivity and,
even more broadly, that of truth (etc.) have taken on meaning and imposed
themselves. That does not in the slightest discredit them. In the name of which other
“truth,” moreover, would it?”
Characteristically, Derrida states he believes in objectivity “in a given situation”; he is
suspicious of attempts to use the concept of “objectivity” to authorise any general
course of action.
A lesson we might draw from Derrida’s views is that in reading a safety text, a
principle of reasonable doubt applies to all our interpretations. It is hard to be sure
that one derives an interpretation because there is plausible evidence for it or because
it is in one’s own interest or nature to perceive it; a confusion of these is always
possible, since self interest and conviction are not of necessity mutually exclusive.
The nearest we can get to being “objective” readers is to recognise the possibility that
our context necessarily robs us of absolute and foundational objectivity, perhaps
without our knowledge. But when making our judgements, to avoid the incoherence
of relativism, (which Derrida dismisses as “a philosophical position in contradiction
with itself”) we need to exercise and develop a keen sense of proportion, keep an open
mind, and pay due respect to our traditions whilst challenging them intellectually in a
single gesture.
3.6 … and Perhaps Another
If the reader is wondering how this text reveals its own “aporias”, consider the
following problems. Firstly, one of its interpretations of a quoted passage suggested
that the passage betrays a flawed safety culture in a certain organisation; yet by
choosing not to reveal who the advisor is and who he works for, this document
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compounds the original “felony” perpetrated in the example email, exactly as its
argues that the advisor did.
Secondly, the “principle” of reasonable doubt described above invites self-
application: if language always leads to incoherence and ambiguity, leaving room for
subjectivity of interpretation, how can I as an author be sure that my principle of
reasonable doubt is not itself doubtful? You could write your own commentary on this
no doubt, and I could reply, others could become involved, and so on.
In deconstructive thinking, the endlessness of the interpretive process and the slippery
nature of the context complicate rational discourse, so that absolute and definite
conclusions cannot be assumed. Aporia leading to endlessness of debate is viewed as
philosophically inescapable phenomenon. Derrida often defines deconstruction as
“what happens”. Thus instead of trying to settle debates, deconstructive thinkers aim
to re-open them and keep them open. As Martin McQuillan in “Five Strategies For
Deconstruction” states (McQuillan 2000, p. 41):
“It is this persistent challenge to thinking – a thinking that asks us to think about
thought – which means that there is no end to the task of deconstruction, and perhaps
explains why those complacent enough to refuse reflection have little time for
deconstruction.”
3.7 Meta-risks of Language
Natural language is intractable because it has a recursive structure, but not the simple
recursive structure that we are familiar with in programming languages. Linguistic
self-reference does not resolve into basic and meaningful units of value, as recursion
must in a program. In language, the perceived relationships between units are the
meaning(s). We can see this in a dictionary: words can only be defined using other
words, but the primitive units of a word are its phonemes and as far as linguists can
tell phonemes are meaningless. If meaning is a product only of perceived
relationships, it is not so surprising that language reveals as much about what we are,
our habits of thought, our culture, and our hidden motivations, as what we are trying
to say with it.
Our commonsense view of reading as a process of uncovering explicit authorial
intention is not entirely inaccurate, but it cannot deal with situations where authorial
intentions are not coherent enough to yield a confident interpretation, or where we are
reading our own context into the text in a way that is unfair to the author. No language
connects with reality in a fundamentally simple way; Wittgenstein had originally
assumed this, but later came too see it as a crucial mistake. The nature of the
connection between language and reality is still debated. For example, Devitt &
Sterelny (1999) give an intemperate but interesting defence of the view that language
is “causally grounded” in pre-linguistic experience; but they do not claim that the
causal connection between language and reality is easy to pin down.
A “meta-risk” of the language is that it drifts free of reality in pursuit of an internal
coherence that, deconstructive thinkers argue, no text ever quite brings off anyway.
Although our technical writing tries marginalise rhetorical figures and 
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legerdemain, deconstruction predicts that it can never completely purge itself of them:
to test this prediction, it is legitimate to question technical documents along
deconstructive lines. Deconstructive thinkers are remarkable astute at demonstrating
that phrases which are treated as literal by readers are in fact metaphorical in nature.
For example consider the meaning of the phrase “the salient point”; there is nothing
objective about insisting that one point in a document is more important than the
others and using a metaphor of surfaces as a “demonstration”.
Deconstruction predicts hidden incoherence in our discourse. It also suggests that
even apparently coherent arguments may not be securely “anchored” to reality (my
resort to the metaphor of “anchorage” is illustrative of the problem in itself). This is a
particularly pertinent issue in safety prediction: the future a safety arguments must
connect to at the time of certification is essentially an imaginative construct, a
narrative fiction based on expert terminology and domain experience; our judgements
depend upon a definition of “risk” that is itself not ideologically neutral (for example,
it includes “severity”).
In making interpretations in our work, both personally and as a community of experts,
we need to keep in mind that our judgements depend on metaphysical assumptions,
whether we know about them or not. As well as human life and health, safety
engineers idealise values such as rigour, clarity, scientific evidence, safety
improvement, technical progress, and truth; so it is all the more important that we
accept linguistic meta-risk.
A key risk of concern of deconstruction is circularity. In other words, do we merely
justify as “acceptable” or “unacceptable” those risks that we have already
unconsciously decided are acceptable or unacceptable? Are the assumptions we make
merely selected to guarantee the conclusion we have already decided upon? To keep
safety engineering in motion as an activity of discovery rather than self-justification
would be a key benefit of deconstructing it.
Twin charges of circularity and hidden incoherence are easy to lay; indeed,
deconstruction itself is by no means free of them (see, for example, p. 114 of Derrida
1977); but because safety engineering is founded upon a valuation of human lives and
health, laying continual siege to its linguistic foundations and the assumptions they
embody could be adopted as a moral imperative. Technology is not forced into
inactivity by such challenges, for only the presupposed pursuit of technology makes
the questioning worthwhile. Perhaps safety experts who argue that safety is a
“process” not a “thing” intuitively understand this.
3.8 Safety Culture
The advice document is indicative of the problems of safety culture in an
organisation. Whatever the precise facts surrounding the case discussed (e.g. whether
or not the author of the indiscreet email has been disciplined, and if so for what), the
text reveals that concerns for safety are unlikely to be uniform in quantity or nature
throughout an organisation. Quantitative and qualitative differentials could be
identified.
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For example, our suspicious interpretation is over-simplified because its claims that
there is a uniform culture of concealment in the organisation. Such uniformity is
contradicted by the fact that the advisor is no doubt genuinely concerned with safety
issues, and is authorised to take part in public debates about safety, even if the author
of the suspicious email has very different concerns. The question a regulator could
well ask is whether the advisor or the email authors has the most power and status in
the organisation. On DERIDASC we examine whether deconstructive analyses of
texts could help safety assessors toward legitimate questions about the safety culture
differentials at work in the dynamics of safety engineering. It is risky to suppose that
deconstructive analyses can be the basis of an evaluation method, but the project will
assess the feasibility of doing so.
4 Background Literary Theory
In the following sections, we review each of aspects of literary theory that have
influenced the DERIDASC project. Literary theory is an enormous field, and these
brief summaries are intended for those safety engineers and computer scientists who
are unfamiliar with them.
4.1 Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics originally referred to the exegesis of sacred texts such as the Bible, with
the aim of using those texts to help decide on the morality of a course of action; but in
the nineteenth century the term came to refer to the theory of interpretation in general.
The subject is founded on the ideas of German thinkers Friedrich Schleiermacher and
Wilhelm Dilthey who argued the need for a general theory of “understanding”. To
these thinkers, we owe the concept of the “hermeneutic circle”. Described by
Schleiermacher and named by Dilthey, the hermeneutic circle is described by Abrams
(1999 p. 128) as follows:
“… in order to understand the determinate meanings of the verbal parts of any
linguistic whole, we must approach the parts with a prior sense of the meaning of the
whole; yet we can know the meaning of the whole only by knowing the meanings of its
constituent parts. This circularity of the interpretive process applies to the
interrelations between the single words within any sentence and the sentence as a
whole, as well as to interrelations between all single sentences and the work as a
whole.”
Dilthey claims that the hermeneutic circle is not necessarily a vicious one; a feedback
process, in which reader expectations are confirmed or modified is involved; the
process converges upon a retrospective understanding of the whole text. For example,
the hermeneutic circle explains why the titles and content structuring of technical
documentation is considered so important: the contents section gives the reader
evidence for a high-level hypothesis about what is to come.
In the late twentieth century, hermeneutic ideas pursued two different paths. The first
path is exemplified by the work of Hans George Gadamer, especially his landmark
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text “Truth and Method” (Gadamer 1960). Gadamer sees the hermeneutic circle as a
process of temporal and historical interaction between past and present. Readers bring
a set of preconceptions to a text; these preconceptions reflect their own time and
situation, and interact with those of the author to produce meaning dynamically.
Gadamer sees understanding as an endless dialogue that produces new meanings for
different readers with different perspectives at different times. It is the view of reading
argued in Section 3. Gadamer presupposes no “final” interpretation that terminates the
interpretative process indeed he goes so far as to describe history in terms of
interpretation as “the conversation we are”.
The other line of development in hermeneutics is found in the work of American E.D.
Hirsch. In “Validity In Interpretation” (1967) and the “Aims of Interpretation” (1976)
Hirsch continues with Dilthey’s line of thought to derive a justification of “objective”
interpretation. Hirsch asserts that a text means what the author intends it to mean;
what an author “intends to mean” is not their “state of consciousness”, as
phenomenological criticism would have it, but rather their use of the accepted
conventions of language, which they know linguistically competent readers will
recognise. Hirsch claims that the hermeneutic circle converges, if not to absolute
agreement, at least to a degree that is sufficient for claims of objective knowledge. To
make this claim, Hirsch distinguishes between “verbal meaning” and “significance”,
“meaning” being the determinate and stable intention by the writer to “intend”
something, and “significance” being what the reader subjectively makes of this. To
Hirsch, Gadamer’s “dialogue” has to do with subjective significance, but nothing to
do with “verbal meaning”.
Hirsch rationalist view is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it pre-supposes
rational authors and rational readers. In the previous section, we gave an example of
how deconstruction explores the possibility that the intentions of an author, or those
of a reader, might be logically incoherent or biased. Secondly, Hirsch’s theory
depends on a problematic phenomenological perspective in supposing that an author’s
intentions are purely pre-linguistic and that linguistic conventions merely indicate
these intentions. The idea of pre-linguistic meaning has come under fierce attack in
recent years by literary critics, postmodern philosophers, and linguists alike. Eagleton
(1996, p. 59) challenges:
“Perhaps the reader would care to experiment here by looking up from the book for a
moment and ‘meaning’ something silently in his or her head. What did you mean?
And was it different from the words in which you have just formulated the response?”
The more prevalent view, important in the understanding of a dispute once central to
deconstruction, is expressed by Eagleton (1996, p.52) as follows:
“The hallmark of the ‘linguistic revolution’ of the twentieth century, from Saussure to
Wittgenstein to contemporary literary theory, is the recognition that meaning is not
simply something ‘expressed’ or ‘reflected’ in language, it is actually produced by it.
It is not as though we have meanings, or experiences, which we then proceed to cloak
with words; we can only have meanings and experiences in the first place because we
have language to have them in.”
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The implication that a living being cannot have an experience without a language to
have it in might seem preposterous to some, even though the idea of “meaning” as a
kind of pre-linguistic intention does seem problematic; but this is exactly what a
number of postmodernist linguists and deconstructive thinkers have proposed, largely
by asserting that perception itself is symbolic. Nonetheless given our concern with
possible circularity in safety engineering discourse, extreme linguistic relativity could
a potential source of risk. The issue is further discussed in Section 5.1.
4.2 Structuralism
The movement known as structuralism begins with the work of Ferdinand Saussure
(1857-1913). Saussure is often called the “father of modern linguistics” (Culler 1976).
Deconstruction can be understood as a descendant of structuralism (deconstructive
thought is sometimes called “post-structuralism”), even though it is partly a reaction
against it.
Saussure’s “Course In General Linguistics” marked the transition to “modern”
linguistics in the following way: before Saussure, linguists had focused primarily on
the historical study of languages, for example how the meanings of individual words
had evolved over time. Saussure calls this the “diachronic” perspective. He opposes
this perspective to his own, which he calls the “synchronic”.
The synchronic perspective involves the study of language as a coherent system,
divorced from historical concerns. Saussure argues that linguists should take a
“snapshot” of a language at a particular stage in its development and analyse its
functioning as an independent system. Structuralism asserts that a linguistic system
consists of units and rule-governed relations between the units. Saussure’s view will
be familiar to computer scientists, especially those with a background in formal
methods. Saussure effectively argued for the analysis of language as a formal system,
and one can see a clear tradition leading from Saussure to the methods based on
predicate logic that have been most famously applied by Noam Chomsky in more
recent times.
This synchronic view of language is hierarchical: phonemes are built into words,
words into sentences, sentences into speeches (in writing the hierarchical structuring
is taken further using paragraphs, chapters, parts, books, trilogies, and so on).
Saussure identifies two main types of relationship in language, which he calls
“syntagmatic” and “paradigmatic” relations; these will be familiar to users of BNF
grammars (although in BNF the two types of relationship may be combined in a
single rule). Syntagmatic relationships are “horizontal” rules, in that they define the
valid sequencing of units, for example, the noun-verb-object rule. Paradigmatic
relations are “vertical” relations between units that can replace one another; an
example is a suffix: the word “friend” can be suffixed with “less” “ly” “ship”, all of
which lead to a legal word.
Structuralism views language as a hierarchical system founded upon the two basic
relations of identity (equality) and difference (inequality); these concepts are
necessary in order to define the paradigmatic and syntagmatic rules. Structuralism
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asserts that relations of identity and difference are the only relations needed to explain
the workings of each level of language (Culler 1986, p. 49).
The question addressed by structuralist linguistics, one to which deconstruction
returns again and again, is how exactly one recognises identities and differences in
language. For example, consider spoken accents: how is that we are able to “filter
out” the aspects of a strong accent that differ from our own where these do “count” in
the language being used, and yet recognise in it the differences that do “count”?
Saussure’s answer is, of course, because the hearer is competent in the application of
an underlying system of identities and differences.
The structuralist question can be extended beyond the discipline of linguistics: how is
it that we are led to see certain differences as important and ignore others? This
question has impacted on almost all the human sciences. It has psychological aspects
(e.g. in the study of perception), philosophical aspects (e.g. in the study of ethics), and
political aspects (e.g. the study of class), sociological aspects (e.g. the study of class),
and economic aspects (e.g. the study of “value”). In all these diverse studies, the
fundamental structuralist question is what underlying system accounts for perceived
and ignored differences, and how can it best be modelled and understood?
4.3 Semiotics
Saussure is also famous for his definition of the linguistic “sign”. Saussure viewed a
sign as a binary structure consisting of the signifier (the gesture, sound, or written
form of an utterance) and a signified (the concept or meaning). The signified is the
sensible aspect of the sign and the signified the intelligible aspect.
Saussure’s model did not encourage close study of the relationship between the
signified and its “referent”, the real phenomena to which concepts supposedly refer.
The pursuit of Saussure’s model led later post-structuralist thinkers into controversy:
structuralism and post-structuralism have been widely criticised for ignoring the
causal grounding of linguistic concepts in our experiences of the natural world; this
omission, it is argued, opens the way to extreme forms of linguistic relativism (see
Section 5.1)
Of particular importance is his observation that the relationship between the signified
and the signifier is arbitrary: for example, there is no reason why a signified such as
our concept of a “dog” should be linked with that particular signifier; in French the
signified is “chien”. Signifiers from different languages share no properties in
common, except perhaps from a diachronic point of view (e.g. they may be derived
from a historical root).
Saussure also realised that systems of conventions underpin all spheres of human
activity; in other words, that gestures, pictograms, clothes, could all be viewed as
signifiers within some system of conventions. This general concept of the sign
exceeds the scope we generally grant to linguistics. A science of signs then (or as
Saussure called it a “semiology”) could find applications in almost any sphere of
symbolic activity, including the arts, scientific discourse, fashion, law, politics, in fact
human culture in general. We can certainly view safety engineering, in this light: it
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involves the symbolic gesture of certification (colloquially, the “signing off”) of a
system according to a set of fixed conventions (standards, tests, and certification
procedures)
Saussure’s idea of a science of signs (semiology), and those of early pioneers like as
Charles Sanders Pierce, were not widely taken up until the birth of modern
anthropology in the late 1950’s. The anthropological emphasis on the systematic
understanding of cultures and their rituals reawakened interest. At the same time,
literary critics realised that their attempts to understand literary conventions could be
framed within a general science of signs.
Semiotics is not yet recognised as an independent discipline, partly because its
potential field of application is so vast. However, many different theoretical
formulations of the “sign” have been developed and applied. Semiotics has involved
distinguished philosophers of language such as Thomas Seboek, Roman Jakobson,
and anthropologists such as Claude Levi Strauss. Studies continue today: Umberto
Eco, more famous as a prize-winning novelist, is a noted semiotician and author of
seminal books on the subject (see entries in Cobley 2001). Semiotics has found
lucrative applications in advertising; however, so far it has failed to find its identity as
an academic discipline.
Derrida’s interventions into semiotics have been typically “deconstructive” (even
unconstructive) but nonetheless highly influential (Derrida 1967). He has challenged
the theory there is a unified signified (concept) present to the mind which the signifier
simply delivers or reveals to the receiver. He proceeds via a deconstruction of the
sensible-intelligible opposition upon which Saussure’s definition depends: for
Saussure’s system to avoid self-contradiction, the concept of the “signified” must be a
concept that is both sensible and intelligible; in other words, it must be an impossible
(according to Derrida) “transcendental signified”. One can question the idea that
sound and sense are separable, and Derrida’s argument has bases in everyday
observation: for example, few people are immune to the pleasures of words that
“sound good” whilst having only the haziest of ideas about their meaning; and one
can question whether different words with the same referent really “mean” the same
thing.
A semiotic discipline would depend on other problematic distinctions, and Derrida is
not the only challenger. As Culler argues (1986, Chapter 4), the relationship between
signs and signifiers is not always arbitrary. Semiotics is supposedly the study of the
“sign proper”, where the signifier-signified relationship is arbitrary and conventional;
but there are at least two other types of sign: in the icon, the relationship between the
signifier is not arbitrary but determined by resemblance (e.g. paintings, drawings,
schematic blueprints); in the index, the link is causal (e.g. smoke proverbially
indicates fire). Our systems of signs tend to mix these types: for example, UK road
signs mix icons with signs-proper from language. Furthermore, indexes commonly
mutate into icons. Culler gives the example of “status symbols’ like ownership of a
Rolls Royce, which is “caused” by wealth but has come to represent it. The class of
indexes is problematic because it includes almost everything we perceive and try to
interpret, e.g. symptoms in medicine, observed events in physical or chemical
experiments. Yet it is clearly unsatisfactory to claim that a “science” of signs need not
account for icons and indices.
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Some signs are difficult to classify in this threefold scheme. An example from safety
engineering is the “carrot diagram” used to explain the ALARP Principle (HSC 1998,
p. 32). This diagram may resemble a carrot, but it is intended to capture something far
more elusive. It should presumably be viewed as iconic of “tolerability”, but it is
unclear what this could mean: no “physical” resemblance is implied, although the
proportions used seem to be purposive.
In the revised introduction of Culler (2001), the author implies that deconstruction has
robbed semiotics of its central theoretical concept, the sign as a structured and
coherent object. Nonetheless, semiotic studies form part of the linguistic background
to deconstruction and a concern with the elicitation of hidden aspects of texts is
common to both. As Culler (1986, p. 128) puts it “the attempt to show, in each area,
that meanings or truths we might be inclined to take as given are the product of
semiotic systems has been a powerful means of demystification and analysis”. Since
one hypothesis of DERIDASC is that texts are suggestive of the safety culture of the
source organisation, we can take opportunities to test this claim as they arise.
4.4 Post-structuralism and Deconstruction
The term “post-structuralism” is interchangeable with term “postmodern”. Abrams
(1999, p 238) recommends that the term “postmodern” be reserved for art and
literature and “post-structuralism” for philosophy and criticism in general, but this
convention has not been widely adopted.
The synchronic view of language taken by structuralists assumed that language could
be modelled as a system and studied systematically. Post-structuralism challenges this
view; in particular it draws attention to the impossibility of viewing language as a
stable system, and of achieving a clear and abstract separation between the synchronic
and diachronic views of language. For the purposes of this discussion, a running
analogy between language and money helps in summarising the post-structuralist
challenge to structuralism.
Saussure and the structuralist thinkers he influenced argued that identities and
differences were the only relations required to define a linguistic system. A word is
recognised by means of its differences from other words in the linguistic system: no
utterance is a perfect representation of its ideal form, but for any utterance, some of
the differences that can be discerned count in the linguistic system (e.g. use of an
ungrammatical suffix) and some will not (e.g. a slight alteration of accent). This view
implies that words do not “contain” meaning, as a vessel might hold a substance. For
example, the meaning of the word “dog” derives from its relations to the other words
in the linguistic system. It is not merely frivolous if one is a structuralist to claim that
“not a cat” is part of the meaning of “dog”; likewise “not a table”, “not a chair” “is a
canine” etc, form part of the system of relations. Words have effects of meaning that
are a product of their relations to other words. Consider the analogy with coins: coins
are not inherently valuable, but gain value from the rules for exchange defined for
them.
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Pursuing the analogy further suggests the desirability of an unquestionable and basic
unit of value, in terms of which all other values of the system are defined. In
economics, this foundational substance has traditionally been gold. However, in
reality, if the value of gold fluctuates, the stability of the entire economic system is
threatened. A monetary system can never be a stable one, as we observe in practice,
because the valuation of gold fluctuates; and its value is socially constructed.
Post-structuralism questions the validity of the structuralist programme to systematise
language by arguing that language is an essentially unstable system. Any attempt to
systematise language must ignore its inherently unstable nature and is even an
invitation to change the language.
In Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida argued the impossibility of any stable unit of
meaning upon which a system of language could be grounded (the “transcendental
signified”). Many such terms have been used in this way, such as “god” “truth”,
“spirit” and “essence”. These are terms which are assumed to be realities outside the
system, and yet also within it, providing it with a secure and stable foundation.
However, if meaning is a function only of a set of relations, as structuralism asserts,
then to be meaningful, a supposed transcendental signified cannot encapsulate any
‘pure’ meaning. In this case, the transcendental signified cannot be superordinated to
the other linguistic units. It can be asserted as foundational, but the assertion can
always be questioned. To return to our coinage analogy, to claim that gold is the
foundation of a monetary system is problematically circular, because the value of gold
can be expressed only in monetary terms.
The diagnosis of this kind of circularity recurs throughout deconstructive readings in
philosophy and literature. The attempt to separate opposing values and superordinate
one of them leads to contradiction because the opposing values depend upon one
another for their own identity.
Consider the use of formal proof in computer engineering. Clearly in logic, the value
‘true’ means “not false” and the value ‘false’ means “not true”. Yet the subjective
human valuation of the ‘truth’ as somehow superior to the ‘falsity’ entails the risk that
our emotional engagement in establishing beliefs and hopes as truths leads us into
bias, dismissive attitudes, unconscious evasion, or mere carelessness. To counter the
risk, we submit formal arguments to the test of a system that does not place the value
‘true’ in a superordinate relationship to the value ‘false’, e.g. a system of proof rules
or an automated proof checker.
Abrams (1999, p. 238) refers to post-structuralism as antifoundationalism, in that it
expresses scepticism about the claimed self-evidence of the founding concepts on
which systematic theories are based. The question of whether an apparently coherent
system of thought is founded on a secretly contradictory ground can be asked of
almost any theory. Post-structuralist scepticism has been applied to the founding
axioms of logic. Derrida has questioned both the law of identity, and the law of the
excluded middle, arguing that both involve the exclusion from consideration of
certain empirically known phenomena. Naturally, the law of non-contradiction has not
been challenged and Derrida like other philosophers, seems to regard it as essential to
philosophy of any sort (Davies 2001).
DERIDASC 1 30 24/04/2002
What Derrida and deconstruction do challenge is the idea that any non-literary text
has any authority and basis in truth that literary texts cannot also claim. Abrams
(1999, p. 59) summarises the deconstructive challenge eloquently:
“The claim is made by some literary critics that a literary text is superior to non-
literary texts, but only because, by its self-reference, it shows itself to be more aware
of the features that all texts inescapably share: its fictionality, its lack of genuine
ground, and especially its patent “rhetoricity”, or use of figurative procedures –
features that make any “right reading” or “correct reading” of a text impossible.”
This list of challenges is a succinct definition of the questioning procedures we will
experiment with on DERIDASC.
4.5 Speech Act Theory
Deconstruction and Speech Act theory operate within a philosophical tradition that
studies effects of language that go beyond the neutral representation of truths and
falsehoods. This tradition departs from the observation that the everyday distinction
between actions and words is too simplistic; an utterance is an action, as is obvious
from our behaviour (e.g. rhetorical devices in promises, warnings, threats, jokes) and
our political processes (e.g. oaths, legal pronouncements, official statements). From
this viewpoint, phrases like “the force of an argument” and “a moving speech”,
suggest phenomena at work that go beyond representation.
The older tradition, still apparent in the work of modern philosophers and linguists,
concentrates on meaning as logical predication. In this view, each sentence can be
translated into a set of logical predicates and the truth conditions of those predicates
give “the meaning”.  This is a difficult approach because attempts to systematise
language almost invite transgression. Furthermore, few who have watched a fictional
drama would argue that sentences corresponding to false predicates have no effect
upon the audience. Logical analyses of language can only study those aspects of
meaning that do not depend upon context.
Context is worthy of close study because it is related to the notion of linguistic
change. Repetition in new contexts can lead the effects of words to mutate. For
example, the words “September 11th” were not especially significant before that day
in 2001. Even “meaningless” words can have significant non-literal effects.
Chomsky’s example of a grammatically correct but literally meaningless sentence
“Colourless green ideas sleep furiously” is arguably no longer meaningless. Most of
us recognise it as meaning: “a famous example of a grammatically correct but
“literally meaningless” (the predicates it proposes are false) sentence”. The effects of
realisation, recognition, puzzlement or surprise need not be excluded from linguistic
analyses by a concentration on “the literal meaning”; most language users have never
heard of “predicates” and it is doubtful that they understand language using logical
techniques. Indeed, some philosophers challenge the distinction between literal and
non-literal effects of utterances.
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The ideas of Speech-Act Theory derive from the lecture notes published as “How To
Do Things With Words” by the Oxford philosopher John L. Austin (Austin 1963).
After Austin’s death, his ideas were developed by his protégé John R Searle and
others. Speech Act Theory is of interest in safety engineering because it is concerned
with utterances that bring into being the state of affairs they seem to describe. Well-
known examples of these performative utterances are “I now pronounce you man and
wife” and “I call this meeting to order”. A system certification might be seen as a
formal pronouncement that a system is “adequately safe for use”; and the obvious
observation that this might not turn out to be true leads us to one of the major
difficulties in Speech Act Theory: speech-acts can fail, or in the terminology of
Austin, they can be “infelicitous”; for example, a speaker might be an actor on stage,
could be repeating the words without the authority to do so, could be attempting
deception, or might not be fully cognisant of what they are saying. Austin and Searle
deal with this difficulty by distinguishing sharply between felicitous “ordinary” uses
of language, where the intentions of the speaker are assumed to be pure and sincere,
and “parasitic” uses that run the risk of infelicity.
Austin argued that traditional philosophical approaches to language concentrated too
much on isolating the literal meaning of individual sentences out of context. Austin
argued that using language involves at least three, and sometimes four, simultaneous
types of speech-act:
a) We make a locution (an utterance or mark of some form)
b) We refer to an object and predicate something about it.
c) We perform an illocutionary act: that is we attach a certain “force” to the
utterance, marking it as a claim, a promise, a warning, praise, a vote of thanks,
a question or a command.
d) We may additionally have a perlocutionary effect on the recipient: if there is
such an effect, and the illocutionary act is either recognised or misinterpreted
by the recipient it will cause some emotional response (fear, puzzlement,
anger). This in turn may affect the actions of the hearer.
Speech-act theory contrasts performative utterances with “constative” utterances that
make propositions (i.e. only elements a and b are involved). This distinction can be
problematic. For example, a safety approval is a speech-act with constative elements.
One criteria is that the accident rate exceeds that specified in the safety claim; hence
the certification is a constative speech-act; it makes a predication that can be falsified.
The constative predicate fails if the system exceeds the claimed accident rate in use.
However, a certification may be infelicitous in other ways: for example, it may be
rejected by a higher authority. One can also question whether a certification “brings
into being the state of affairs it describes”. In other words, does each successive
certification, by making a claim of “adequate safety” lead to a reinforcement of our
acceptance of the claimed figure as “adequate”? Safety certification is better viewed
as a performative speech-act:
a) The locution is the certificate that is issued.
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b) The system is the object referred to and “adequate safety” is predicated.
c) The illocutionary force attached to a certification is difficult to
characterise: it might seen as a promise that a safety claim will be met or
exceeded; but it is also a warning of risk (absolute safety is never claimed).
It is equivocal. Nonetheless, it involves an assertion of authority and
claimed expertise.
d) The intended perlocutionary effect is presumably to reassure those at risk,
to persuade them to use the system. The certification may not have this
effect.
Speech-act theory also leads us to consider what the “felicitous” outcomes of a
certification of could be. For example, is an accident necessarily an “infelicitous”
outcome of the certification speech-act? In terms of the constative test, if an accident
does not falsify the claimed rate, the accident is not strictly “infelicitous”.
A single accident within the rate need not in principle have any effect on ideas of
acceptability; but in practice society often challenges the basis of a certification after
each successive accident (possibly through legal action), and changes in the
acceptance criteria are made to stop the accident from recurring.
Contextual changes subject performative speech-acts to changes in illocutionary force
and perlocutionary effect. These changes return us to the subjectivity inherent in the
cost-benefit analyses presupposed in the notion of “adequate safety”. This is a general
problem with performative speech-acts: through habitual exercise, or through re-
interpretation in different contexts, they may lose their illocutionary authority and
intended perlocutionary effect. For example, early aviation pioneers felt that their
vision was worth the high risks. Now that flying is habitual, individual subjective
tolerance of risk is generally much lower: we feel that if flying is to remain habitual,
the risks should be low and get continually lower; the “acceptable” risks of flying
ninety years ago are no longer acceptable. It is likely that habit and risk intolerance
are mutually reinforcing; as risk taking becomes more habitual, attention to the nature
of the risks falls off, and the more outrage results when accidents happen. However,
habit also affects the “likelihood” element in risk: habitual behaviour can lead to the
taking of more risks with reduced regard for the possible consequences.
The act of certification itself could be subject to this vicious circle. Even though
safety engineering pursues an ethic of constant risk reduction, due to a conviction that
safety claims and safety levels should increase over time, this ethic may be
unrealisable in practice; countervailing forces of reinforcement (due to continuous
periods without accidents) and inertia (through economics or conservative attitudes)
are also at work. Once an accident does occur, these forces are often termed
“complacency”; but before an accident they are “realistic”. Successive instances of
felicitous certification cannot escape this logic: no matter what the claimed rate, any
accident can rob the certification of its intended perlocutionary effect.
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4.6 Speech Act Theory and Deconstruction
Speech Act Theory is the site of a famous dispute between Derrida and Searle about
the relative validity of so-called “ordinary language” philosophy. The Austin/Searle
approach treats “infelicitous” and fictional language as “logically dependent” or
“parasitic” upon “ordinary” language. Derrida’s challenge in his essay “Signature,
Event, Context” is that this opposition is unsustainable because the risks of infelicity
are inherent in the very nature of language: to function at all, an utterance needs to be
recognisable, and it needs to be quotable in different contexts in the absence of the
speaker; in other words, utterances are inherently insecurely “attached” to the
intentions of the speaker (Derrida 1977).
Derrida argues that Austin’s distinction misses the opportunity to develop a truly
general theory of language that deals directly with citationality and instability. Speech
Act philosophers have made the generic mistake of relying on what Derrida calls a
“metaphysics of presence”: in this particular case, the assumption of a pure intention-
to-say-something (in French “vouloir dire”) is present and utterly transparent in the
utterance itself.
Throughout his career, Derrida has constantly questioned the notion that it is possible
to infer the existence of a coherent intention-to-say-something merely from
observations of the operation of a signifying system (e.g. speech). Speech-act theory
makes the assumption that this intentionality pre-exists the signifying system, but
Derrida’s argues that our intentions are caught up in the operation of language in a
much more complex way, and suggests that language is not securely governed by
them. Language commonly escapes our intentionality, and our intentions are partly a
creation of language.
In everyday life example, things do seem to work as Derrida suggests; humans use the
processes of speech and writing to formulate their intentions, and so it is hard to know
whether or not the words themselves cause the intentions we form; some authors have
gone further than Derrida, and questioned the idea that a pre-linguistic intention is
possible. Derrida’s position in “Signature, Event, Context” is that intentionality “has
its place” in the understanding of communication, but that its use as a foundational
axiom in a theory of “ordinary” language is unjustifiable.
Despite his critique, Derrida does not rejects the basis of Austin’s original enquiry,
and Speech Act Theory provides DERIDASC with an interesting set of concepts for
the analysis of safety engineering language. Any deconstructive reading will pay as
much attention to the way an argument is phrased as to what is apparently being said.
Derrida has called his deconstructive strategy “double reading”, in that it combines
the classical approach that tries to elicit authorial intention with its own
“destabilising” approach. Derrida argues that deconstruction has nothing to do with
“destruction” (the quip in reply is “It has if you take the ‘con’ out of it”) and has never
“written-off” speech-act theory; on the contrary, in “Signature, Event, Context”
Derrida acknowledges Austin’s work as the necessary departure point for many of his
own enquiries.
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5 Critiques of Deconstruction
Derrida’s challenges to Austin’s speech-act theory drew an eventual reply from Searle
called “Re-iterating the Differences: A Reply To Derrida”. We need not enter the
dispute here, but needless to say, Searle’s reply fails to convince Derrida. Derrida’s
rejoinder “Limited Inc A, B, C” is lengthy, more explicit than much of his writing,
and makes use of satirical literary devices that mimetically contradict Searle’s
argument, including the charge that, since he acknowledges background discussions
with colleagues, Searle’s argument can hardly be “his” despite it being marked
“Copyright John Searle 1977”; it must, Derrida says, be the product of a Societé à
responsabilité limitée (SARL) – a “Limited Company”. Consequently, Derrida refers
to the presumed author of the “Reply” throughout as “Sarl”, and distinguishes him
scrupulously from John Searle. Furthermore, he quotes Searle’s paper at such length
that he includes it all in his own essay, thus denying the validity of the copyright, and
wonders if prosecution will follow.
Derrida’s unpopularity with Anglo-American philosophers no doubt derives from the
fact that the combination of rigorous questioning and sophisticated literary devices
serve to make straightforwardness and the pursuit of clarity look naïve; or perhaps
they regard the open use of literary devices as somehow unethical (Searle refers to
them as “gimmicks”). Derrida’s unpopularity perhaps also derives from the fact that
he does not lay out his ideas in the form of a theoretical exposition in the traditional
way, but instead “reads them” from (into?) the texts of other authors (Abrams 1999, p.
58). As Stephen Hahn notes (Hahn 2002, p. 83), those who regard philosophy as
concerned with asking questions regard Derrida as a philosopher and those who
believe philosophy is concerned with providing answers believe he is a purveyor of
obscure “wisdom literature” and at worst someone who just goes around begging
questions.
Derrida has also been accused of obscurantism. A remark attributed (probably falsely)
to his colleague Michel Foucault is typical (Derrida 1977, see the footnote on p. 159
for Derrida’s retort):
“(Derrida’s prose style is) … ‘obscurantist terrorism’. The text is written so obscurely
that you can’t figure out exactly what the thesis is and when one criticises it, the
author says ‘You have misunderstood me, you are so stupid.’”
This remark is rendered somewhat unlikely by a reading of Foucault’s own prose,
which is hardly clear and simple throughout; perhaps complex ideas cannot be
accurately expressed in simple ways.
Derrida is still not well-regarded by some Anglo American philosophers. A recent
offer of an honorary degree from Cambridge University for Derrida was opposed by a
minority of academics, who went so far as to make statements in the popular press to
try and deny him the honour. They failed. Indeed, one wonders how involving the
popular press in order to influence the views of other colleagues in the matter of a free
vote is supposed to look anything other than deeply suspicious. A more common
“response” to Derrida is to ignore him (books on philosophy that might be expected to
deal with deconstruction tend either to contain numerous references to Derrida’s work
or none whatsoever). The “blind spot” among certain philosophers is odd. Perhaps
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Derrida is “on to something” as regards the contradictory nature of their explanatory
programme. He is often described as someone who is really an anti-philosopher, or as
someone who “reads” philosophy but does not “practice” it.
Derrida does comment on the built-in paradox of philosophy: namely that it needs to
provide answers and yet keep “begging questions” in order to survive. The same
tension is evident in safety engineering: many of our advances derive from the
analysis of accidents, and yet safety engineering is supposed to prevent their
occurrence; for this reason safety experts now recognise the importance of examining
“incidents” that have no unfortunate outcomes – in other words, the importance of
begging questions; but in doing so, safety engineers court the risk of “crying wolf”. In
fact, the phrase “to beg a question” has two meanings: the informal meaning is simply
to raise a question that has not yet been dealt with; but the phrase also refers to the
logical fallacy of including the “conclusion” of an argument as one of its assumptions.
An English speaker could view Derrida’s work as an exploration of the complex
relation that links the two parts of this double-meaning; and in fact, Derrida himself is
sometimes accused of committing the logical fallacy rather than asking the really
important questions. For example, on p.115 of (Derrida 1977) he defends himself
against a charge of having kept alive the superstition of a yearning for “presence” as
inherent in language in order to legitimate his questioning of that concept.
In the following sections, we will concentrate on these more intellectually engaged
critiques of Derrida’s thought.
5.1 The Critique of Linguistic Relativism
Linguistic relativism is a highly controversial aspect of postmodernism. It is an
extreme form of the ‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’, which states that the concepts
supported by a language determine the thoughts of its users (Cobley 2001, p. 286), but
the fact that translation between different language is possible suggests this view is
too extreme. Rationalist frustration with extreme linguistic relativism is evident in the
critique of Devitt & Sterelny (1999). These authors argue that by forgetting the causal
link between reality and language, and denying that the world of real objects is
knowable except through language, postmodernism has become an absurd caricature.
Deconstructive thinkers have recently begun to distance themselves from linguistic
relativism, admitting the functional effectiveness of everyday language, arguing that
their thought has nothing to do with the nature of the real world, and stating that
deconstruction only explains and explores the limitations of language rather than
being a theory of reality. Thus in “Deconstruction is not what you think” Geoffrey
Bennington (in McQuillan 2000, p. 219) states “Deconstruction is not linguistic
relativism.” and McQuillan (2000, p. 21) states: “… the idea of a ‘lion’ is itself
metaphorical. This does not mean that lions do not exist, it would be difficult to
reason with one on such grounds …”. Currently, deconstruction denies the idea that a
text ever gives unmediated and transparent access to reality, but not that reality can be
known only through language. However, in the late 1960’s Derrida made exactly this
claim, i.e. that what we call “perception” is a really a signifying system (Hahn 2002,
Chapter 1). The idea that “perception” does not involve unmediated access to reality
is perhaps not as contentious today as it once seemed, given some of the results of
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modern cognitive psychology; but it is far from clear that perception is inherently
linguistic.
Other postmodernists seem to have “got carried away” by the idea of linguistic
relativism: thus Hawkes as quoted by Devitt & Sterelny (1999, p. 269), enthuses:
“Writing … can be seen to cause a new reality to come into being.”.
Well perhaps, since writing takes place in reality; but the view adopted by members
of the DERIDASC project is that, so far as safety engineering language is concerned,
the debate between linguistic relativism and the reality of pre-linguistic experience
need only be treated with a sense of proportion. In physics, relativistic effects are
noticeable only over great distances, and in language, they are noticeable mainly in
abstract and figural language. Everyday language tends to have a relation to reality
that humans (almost) universally share: we can agree what “dogs” and “cats” are, no
matter what our language is, or at least agree to disagree when we are not sure. Expert
language is often more precise than ordinary language when naming physical objects,
but much of discourse is founded upon intangible concepts which one learns through
imitation, redefinition, and usage, as much as from dictionaries.
Furthermore, linguistic consensus tends to evaporate when language becomes
evaluative of reality; we enter the realm of ideology, moving unscientifically and
alogically from what “is” to what “should” be; it is here that language starts to
produce meaning rather than just reveal it. Namely, it reveals that a priori ethical
presuppositions are operative, if these are not already explicit. Since safety matters
relate to what “should be” in the moral sense, the dangers inherent in clothing
linguistic relativism as objectivity and rationality are very relevant to the DERIDASC
enquiry; but we will have to make sure that an over-estimation of the universality of
our conclusions does not constitute a danger to credibility. Our attempt to exclude
absurdities and develop only useful insights will of course be vulnerable to
deconstruction; but we will leave that task to others.
5.2 The Critique of Anti-foundationalism
Derrida contends that because systematic thinking is based on language, and language
is founded upon linguistic exclusions, the foundations of systematic thought conceal
irrationality and contradiction. As we have seen in Section 3.4, Derrida takes the view
that if a distinction is made, and an example can be found which disobeys the
contrast, then the distinction was never logical. He also argues that the stability in the
definitions that underlie a system of thought can only be fixed only via an act of will,
not of reason.
Surprisingly, challenges to his views are not easy to find. In a famous review of
Jonathan Culler’s book “On Deconstruction” called “The World Turned Upside
Down”, John Searle, one of Derrida’s most noted critics, has this to say:
“The philosophical tradition … involves a search for foundations: metaphysically
certain foundations of knowledge, foundations of language and meaning, foundations
of mathematics, foundations of morality, etc. . . . Now in the twentieth century, mostly
under the influence of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, we have come to believe that this
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general search for these sorts of foundations is misguided … Derrida correctly sees
that there aren't any such foundations, but he then makes the mistake that marks him
as a classical metaphysician. The real mistake of the classical metaphysicians was not
the belief that there were metaphysical foundations, but rather the belief that
somehow or other such foundations were necessary, the belief that unless there are
foundations something is lost or threatened or undermined or put to question.”
Whether or not the loss of rational objectivity is significant is an open question.
Searle’s point is no doubt that one of the things left untouched by Derrida’s
antifoundationalism is the idea of ‘rational objectivity’: but Derrida as we saw in
Section 3.5 states that he “firmly believes” in objectivity “in a given situation”. A
more pertinent criticism might be Searle’s suggestion that Wittgenstein and Heidegger
have already explained the problem in better terms. However, if objectivity is not
really what it has long sought to be, how can the effort spent on the search for
foundations be anything other than lost, threatened, undermined, and put to question?
For safety engineers, it is clear that something is indeed lost if objectivity has no
absolute foundation: one can at best only dress subjective reasons for the acceptance
of safety risks in objective clothes. What is lost, undermined, and put to question is
the time and effort expended on a futile task.
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